Functionalism, Exchange and Theoretical Strategy (RLE Social Theory) by Michael Mulkay

Author:Michael Mulkay [Mulkay, Michael]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138782464
Goodreads: 20667294
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-08-04T00:00:00+00:00

III

Homans’ main theoretical writings are divided into two parts. The first part, which is presented in The Human Group17 (referred to below as HG), is an attempt to build up inductively a series of empirical generalizations. The second stage, presented in Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (referred to below as SB), is an attempt to complete the theoretical scheme by furnishing a number of psychological principles from which the previously constructed generalizations can be derived. The rest of this chapter will be devoted almost exclusively to HG. The latter study resembles the analysis of cross-cousin marriage to the extent that in both instances the main objective is the formulation of sociological generalizations. But there is one fundamental difference. In HG Homans uses a radically different conceptual apparatus.

In the analysis of cross-cousin marriage, Homans investigates the relationship between particular forms of kinship institution and, in so doing, adopts the kind of structural terms used, not only by Lévi-Strauss, but also by Parsons and Merton. In his more comprehensive work, however, he argues that, although legitimate for certain kinds of study, these complex abstractions are unsuitable for the formulation of universal empirical generalizations. To show what he means Homans discusses the terms ‘status’ and ‘role’. He argues that when we describe a particular role we blend together a variety of different types of empirical data: ‘We do not directly observe status and role. What we do observe are activities, interactions, evaluations, norms and controls. Status and role are names we give to a complex of many different kinds of observations.’18 The ‘big abstractions’ of structural-functionalism vary along several, perhaps partly independent, dimensions. For this reason it is difficult, if not impossible, to express in terms of universal generalizations any regular relationships between the empirical phenomena which they represent. For example, it is the complexity of its empirical referents which makes the Homans-Schneider hypothesis unavoidably a statement of probability rather than a universally valid proposition. Furthermore, because the empirical content of such abstractions tends to be unreliable and ambiguous, they can too easily obscure ‘minor’ empirical variations. In fact, Homans argues, conceptualization at this level of abstraction may actually prevent us from noticing explanatory uniformities among such component elements as activities and interaction. He decides, therefore, to begin his theoretical induction at a lower level of abstraction, even if this necessitates the use of a more common-sense terminology. In this way he hopes to ensure that his eventual deductive system will have a reliable empirical foundation and will be composed of universally applicable generalizations: ‘The great point is to climb down from the big words of social science, at least as far as common-sense observation. Then, if we wish, we can start climbing up again, but this time with a ladder we can depend on.’19

In pursuit of conceptual clarity, Homans makes a distinction between first-order and second-order abstractions. A first-order abstraction is a name given to a single class of observations which cannot be further sub-classified. A second-order abstraction is a name referring to several classes of observation combined.

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